Professional Negligence Law Reporter
Medicine
You must be a Professional Negligence Law Reporter subscriber to access this content.
If you are a member of AAJ's Professional Negligence Section or a subscriber, log in below. Not yet a Section member? Join today!
Join the Professional Negligence SectionAlready a subscriber? Log in
Patient had reasonable belief that physician was hospital’s agent
November/December 2025The Michigan Supreme Court held that a hospital may be liable for medical negligence under an ostensible agency theory where the patient reasonably believed the physician was the hospital’s agent.
Mary Anne Markel went to the William Beaumont Hospital ER and allegedly was treated by physician Linet Lonappan, with whom she had no prior relationship. Unbeknownst to Markel, Lonappan, a hospitalist, was assigned to treat her pursuant to an agreement with Markel’s primary care physician. In Markel’s subsequent lawsuit against the hospital, Lonappan, and another individual, the trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital. An intermediate appellate court affirmed, holding the plaintiff had failed to show that she relied on a representation from the hospital that Lonappan was its agent.
Reversing, the state high court found that to establish ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, a plaintiff must show they had a reasonable belief in the agent’s authority. The plaintiff also must rely on the agent’s apparent authority, the court said. Citing case law, the court noted that reliance may be found where a patient presents to the hospital and is looking for treatment. No additional act of reliance by the plaintiff is necessary.
Applying these principles, the court held that the plaintiff had shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding the hospital’s liability for medical malpractice under an ostensible agency theory. The plaintiff presented for treatment at the defendant hospital’s ER and treated with a physician with whom she had no previous relationship, the court said, adding that the hospital had not set forth facts establishing as a matter of law that it had dispelled the plaintiff’s reasonable belief that Lonappan was its agent. The agreement between the plaintiff’s primary care physician and Lonappan’s employer, without more, does not establish that the plaintiff did not rely on the hospital for care, the court concluded, adding that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the agreement at the time of her admission.
Consequently, the court remanded the case.
Citation: Markel v. William Beaumont Hosp., 22 N.W.3d 545 (Mich. 2025).
Plaintiff counsel: AAJ member Jeffrey Meyers, Dearborn, Mich.; and Mark Granzotto, Royal Oak, Mich.