Nos. 25-2693, 25-2722 & 25-2824

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

IGNATUS PAPPAGALLO, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

REDCO CORP., *et al.*,

Defendants-Appellants,

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Case No. 5:25-cv-01852 (Hon. John M. Gallagher)

BRIEF OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 26.1, *amicus curiae* hereby provides the following disclosure statement:

The American Association for Justice (AAJ) has no parent company. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock or has as a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Neither AAJ nor its counsel represent a debtor or trustee in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 2026.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Statutes

Other Authorities

STATEMENT OF INTEREST[1]

The American Association for Justice ("AAJ") is a national, voluntary bar association established in 1946 to strengthen the civil justice system, preserve the right to trial by jury, and protect access to the courts for those who have been wrongfully injured. With members in the United States, Canada, and abroad, AAJ is the world's largest plaintiff trial bar. AAJ members primarily represent plaintiffs in personal injury actions, employment rights cases, consumer cases, and other civil actions. Throughout its 80-year history, AAJ has served as a leading advocate for the right of all Americans to seek legal recourse for wrongful conduct.

This case is of acute interest to AAJ members who have represented and continue to represent plaintiffs in actions where private defendants have sought removal from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which permits removal when federal officers or agencies are

[1] Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees have consented to this brief. Counsel for *amicus curiae* requested consent from counsel for Defendants-Appellants but have not received a response as of this filing. No party's counsel authored this brief, and no party, party's counsel, or person other than *amicus* or its counsel contributed financial support intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

sued or prosecuted, or when the private defendant claims to be acting under a federal officer. Despite the long history of federal-officer removal and the clarity with which courts have applied the relevant standards, defendants continue to invoke federal-officer removal with uncommon frequency, often asserting the barest and most tangential connections to federal actions.

In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania correctly remanded the case to state court because the Plaintiffs expressly waived any potential claims arising from work related to maintaining or repairing federal vessels. The Plaintiffs' disclaimer removes any conceivable federal nexus from this case and renders it ineligible for removal under § 1442(a)(1). *Amicus* urges this Court to affirm.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court and Supreme Court precedent for well over a century has recognized that plaintiffs, not defendants, are masters of the complaint, determining which claims to put forth as part of a plaintiff's right to decide whether to be in state or federal court. Nothing in the federal officer removal statute changes that calculus. In the language

chosen by Congress, in the context in which came into being, in its application throughout history, and in its plain and obvious purpose, the statute permits removal only when the plaintiff has invoked federal law, explicitly or impliedly.

The criteria for federal-officer removal are plainly not met here. No claim involves a defendant "acting under" a federal officer, and no claim is subject to the type of federal defense anticipated by the statute. Here, the plaintiff explicitly denied any claims with a federal nexus and any damages derivative from the speculation the defendants have advanced that a small percentage of the plaintiff's work could possibly have been on federal vessels that resulted in exposure to asbestos. That is an extraordinarily thin reed on which to build federal subject-matter jurisdiction, especially in light of the complete absence of statutory support for the defendant's position.

Defendants and their *amici* instead ask this Court to re-write the statute to achieve their desired outcome, yet this Court should not countenance such an adventurous request. It is clear that a plaintiff who avoids potential federal claims does not engage in artful pleading, for no federal claim is disguised here as a state one. The assertion that the

plaintiff has suffered an indivisible injury does not change that and juries in this era of comparative negligence have no difficulty in attributing the percentage of fault among those for whom proof exists. To the contrary, a plaintiff who cabins the claims put forth acts well within our understanding of the well-pleaded complaint rule, which acknowledges that the plaintiff's choices are a paramount purpose of the rule. This Court should affirm the decision below.

ARGUMENT

I. THE REMOVAL STATUTE'S LANGUAGE, CONTEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE DO NOT SUPPORT REMOVAL ON THE BASIS OF CLAIMS NOT PURSUED.

No rational nexus exists between the claims of the Plaintiffs (collectively, "Pappagallo") and the removing Defendants to support removal on the basis of "acting under" a federal officer. In fact, Pappagallo has explicitly and comprehensively waived any claims with a federal connection. The district court's order to remand the matter to state court should be affirmed.

The federal officer removal statute permits removal to a federal forum of any civil or criminal action against the "United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of

the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

This Court and many others have broken that statutory language into four prongs[2] when applied to a private defendant seeking to remove an action to federal court: (1) the defendant must be a "person" within the meaning of the statute; (2) the plaintiff's claims must be based upon the defendant "acting under" the United States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) the plaintiff's claims against the defendant must be "for or relating to" an act under color of federal office; and (4) the defendant must raise a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff's claims. *Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., Inc.*, 842 F.3d 805, 812 (3d Cir. 2016); *see also Ruppel v. CBS Corp.*, 701 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 2012). To remove a case successfully, a defendant must meet all four requirements. *Maglioli v. Alliance HC Holdings LLC*, 16 F.4th 393, 404 (3d Cir. 2021).

[2] Some circuits have bundled the same elements differently to require compliance with three prongs with no material difference from this Circuit's four requirements. *See, e.g.*, *Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Servs., LLC*, 165 F.4th 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 2026).

To cabin invocations of federal-officer removal in line with congressional intent, particularly because this species of removal is invoked with alarming frequency on the basis of ill-conceived rationales, the statute is applied by reference to its "language, context, history, and purposes." *Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.*, 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007). Those metrics demonstrate the indisputable propriety of the decision to remand this action to state court.

A. The Statute's Text Establishes that Congress Did Not Intend to Address Lawsuits Lacking a Federal Nexus.

Statutes are interpreted "to effectuate Congress's intent." *Hagans v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.*, 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). That intent "is most clearly expressed in the text of the statute," as reflected by its plain language read in the context of its "entire scope." *Id.* (citations omitted). Here, the text plainly reflects an intent that there be a true federal nexus that exists between the Plaintiffs' claims and federal interests. The statute restricts removal to claims against a defendant "acting under" the direction of a federal officer. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To satisfy this prong, the allegations must be "'directed at the relationship between' the federal government and the defendant." *Mohr v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania*, 93 F.4th 100, 105 (3d Cir.

2024) (quoting *In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Couns. Against or Directed to Def. Ass'n of Phila.*, 790 F.3d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 2015)). If a plaintiff entirely foregoes claims involving that relationship, the requirement cannot be met.

The statute further requires the plaintiff's claims relate to "any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). For the same reasons that the earlier prong is not met, this element of federal officer removal is also absent when no potential federally based claim is advanced. Finally, as part of that calculus, the defendant must have a "colorable federal defense" to the claim. *Papp*, 842 F.3d at 814 (citation omitted). Yet there can be no colorable federal defense in the absence of claims relating to acts taken at the direction of a federal officer.[3]

[3] Some Appellants in this matter have claimed a federal defense by asserting "derivative sovereign immunity," a misnomer that the Supreme Court just held is not immunity but a limited defense that "provides protection to a contractor when it has received a lawful authorization and acted according to its terms." *The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal*, No. 24-758, slip op. at 9 (Feb. 25, 2026). However, *Menocal* made plain that the applicable liability at issue to which the defense applies when the "lawful authorization" provides the basis for the alleged liability. In other words, it cannot apply where the claims do not seek damages for federally

When a plaintiff disclaims any claims imbued with a federal interest and chooses not to pursue claims where the defendant acted under a federal officer, it is impossible to reconcile the statutory text with congressional authorization for removal. Because no claim based on the existence of a federal contract or federal direction is at issue, the statute's language forecloses its use for removal.

B. Context, History, and Purpose Also Foreclose Application of Federal-Officer Removal.

The genesis of federal-officer removal and its consistent proper usage over the centuries further support the textual limitation to claims that relate to federal direction and a federal defense. *See, e.g.*, *Willingham v. Morgan*, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969) (holding federal-officer removal requires a "'causal connection' between the charged conduct and asserted official authority") (quoting *Maryland v. Soper (No. 1)*, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926)).

The nation's origins provide the context for federal-officer removal and its genesis. People in the former colonies felt disconnected from a

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authorized activity. Pappagallo's express disclaimer of potential claims on that side of the line obviates the applicability of any "derivative sovereign immunity."

central government, having long enjoyed an allegiance to what were now their States. They thought of themselves as Pennsylvanians, Virginians, and New Yorkers, having not merged into any incipient national identity. *See* Hon. Mark C. Dillon, *U.S. Chief Justice John Jay: When All Judges Were Originalists*, 15 Jud. Notice 20, 22 (2020).

Reflecting that predisposition, the nation's first national charter mandated continued state sovereignty and state independence, U.S. Articles of Confederation art. II, which rendered the national government weak and dependent. Edward S. Corwin, *The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention*, 30 Am. Hist. Rev. 511, 527 (1925) ("[I]n brief, it was not a government at all, but rather the central agency of an alliance."); *see also Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (affirming the States "were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league").

The arrangement proved unworkable. *See* James Madison, *Vices of the Political System of the United States* (Apr. 1787), *in* 2 *The Writings of James Madison* 361, 364 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). A new structural arrangement became necessary to "render the federal Constitution

adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." 1 *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* 120 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901).

That restructuring through a new Constitution did not immediately transfer state-based loyalties to the national government. Federal officers operating within a State were regarded by locals not merely as outsiders, but agents of a remote and problematic sovereign. Issues came to a head when New England opposed the War of 1812, along with the accompanying federal embargo on trade with England, resulting in an 1815 customs statute that authorized removal when federal authorities were haled before state courts for attempting to enforce the embargo. *Willingham*, 395 U.S. at 405. The removal provision enabled federal officials charged for carrying out their duties to face any suit or prosecution in federal court, rather than hostile state courts. *Id.*

Although the 1815 statute expired at the end of the war, Congress worked from the same template as need arose. For example, in the early 1830s, South Carolina enacted its Nullification Act, which declared federal tariff laws unconstitutional and authorized the prosecution of federal agents who collected the tariffs, resulting in a new federal-officer

removal statute in 1833. *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 148. The removal statute did not convey immunity to federal officers, just an opportunity to defend federal prerogatives in a venue "where the authority of the law was recognised." *Willingham*, 395 U.S. at 405 (quoting 9 Cong. Deb. 461 (1833) (Sen. Daniel Webster)).

Eventually, this ground for removal became permanent for the enforcement of federal revenue laws in 1874 and was later expanded to cover all federal officers as part of the Judicial Code of 1948. *Id.* at 406. Each enactment shared a singular purpose: to protect federal officers and the operations of the general government from undue interference in State courts by substituting fairer and more neutral federal courts. *Id.* (citing *Tennessee v. Davis*, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880)). The statute thus seeks to protect "the enforcement of federal law through federal officials," *id.*, by providing a "federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his duties." *Arizona v. Manypenny*, 451 U.S. 232, 241 (1981).

Because the federal government operates through its officers and its agents, federal-officer removal applies as well (the "acting-under" provision) when, in essence, the federal government operates through

private parties. Though many have claimed that status, few actually qualify. The defendants in the instant case do not.

The claims made by Pappagallo stand in vivid contrast to those at issue in *Papp*, for example. In *Papp*, a husband sued Boeing, alleging that this wife's illness and demise was due to "secondary 'take home' asbestos exposure" while washing her first husband's work clothes, which was imbued with asbestos from his job sandblasting landing gear of World War II military cargo planes." *Papp*, 842 F.3d at 809. After Boeing removed the case, it was remanded to state court, but this Court reversed, reasoning that "it is sufficient for the 'acting under' inquiry that the allegations are directed at the relationship between the [defendant] and the [federal officer or agency]." *Id.* at 813 (cleaned up; brackets in original) (quoting *Def. Ass'n*, 790 F.3d at 470). In *Papp*, that was plainly the case, because, "[a]t the heart of Papp's claim against Boeing is the failure to provide sufficient warning about the dangers of asbestos in the landing gear of the C–47 aircraft," which was "manufactured 'for the United States Armed Forces under the direct supervision, control, order, and directive of federal government officers acting under the color of federal office.'" *Id.*

No comparable analysis is possible for the Pappagallo claims. Pappagallo's asbestos exposure claims are entirely based on work on commercial vessels, not military ships. The asbestos on those ships was not manufactured for the United States, and Mr. Pappagallo's actions exposing him to asbestos were not undertaken under the direct supervision, control, order, and directive of federal government officers acting under the color of federal office.

II. PLEADINGS MUST BE READ TO REFLECT PLAINTIFFS' CHOICES.

A. The Plaintiff, Not the Defendant, Is the Master of the Complaint.

Appellants have put forth a remarkable proposition, telling this Court that "the defendant is essentially the master of the pleadings for purposes of § 1442(a)(1)." ViacomCBS Br. 21; *cf.* JCI Br. 1. If this Court were to accept that non-textual argument, it would turn pleading practice on its head. As the Supreme Court unanimously observed:

> the presence of a federal question, . . . , in a defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule—that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1987).

The Court added that:

> a *defendant* cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated. If a defendant could do so, the plaintiff would be master of nothing.

Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).

Although *Caterpillar* was the first Supreme Court decision to adopt the "master of the complaint" moniker, Patrick Woolley, *Counterclaims, Civil Actions, and the Elusive Reach of the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule*, 108 Iowa L. Rev. 801, 822 (2023), earlier decisions embedded the concept in our procedural law. For example, more than a century ago, the Supreme Court in *The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.*, found it unremarkable that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, . . . and accordingly jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the defense." 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).[4] Even earlier, the Supreme Court

[4] *The Fair* has had significant influence. *See, e.g.*, *Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Del.*, 366 U.S. 656, 662 (1961) ("Since 'the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon,' the

found it "wholly unnecessary and improper," to allow the defendant, even in the case of an anticipated federal defense, to assert the jurisdiction of the federal courts. *Devine v. City of Los Angeles*, 202 U.S. 313, 334 (1906); *see also Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co.*, 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915) ("[T]he plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to . . . ."); *Third St. & Suburban R Co v. Lewis*, 173 U.S. 457, 459 (1899) ("[L]ack of jurisdiction cannot be supplied by anything set up by way of defense."); *Metcalf v. City of Watertown*, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888) ("[I]t must appear, at the outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of [federal] character . . . .").

Reflecting this well-established view that the complaint defines the cause of action and thus jurisdiction, Justice Holmes observed for the Court that "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." *American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.*, 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.).

B. Limitations on the Master of the Complaint Concept Do Not Alter the Analysis.

1. The well-pleaded complaint rule is compatible with the plaintiff being master of the complaint.

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complaints in the Delaware Superior Court determine the nature of the suits before it.") (citation omitted) (quoting *The Fair*, 228 U.S. at 25).

Caterpillar called the concept that plaintiff is master of the complaint one of the "paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule." 482 U.S. at 398–99. This Court has agreed. It has explained that the well-pleaded complaint rule "determines whether a claim 'arises under' federal law from a plaintiff's complaint." *Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.*, 207 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 2000). In support of that proposition, this Court cited and quoted *Metropolitan Life v. Taylor*, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) ("It is long-settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law."). On the basis of those standards, *Wood* declared that "[a] plaintiff is, thus, considered the 'master of the complaint.'" 207 F.3d at 678 (quoting *Caterpillar*, 482 U.S. at 398–99).

Consistent with that holding, a plaintiff who pleads a question arising under federal law or one that is subject to complete preemption, has made a choice not to rely solely on state law but to imbue the complaint with federal issues, thereby subjecting it to federal jurisdiction upon removal. "Arising under" jurisdiction is a product of a congressional jurisdictional choice found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Cases usually arise under federal law "when federal law creates the cause of action asserted." *Gunn v. Minton*, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). In those instances, the plaintiff has chosen to plead a federal cause of action.

In other instances, "even where a claim finds its origins in state rather than federal law," there remains a "a "'special and small category' of cases in which arising under jurisdiction still lies." *Id.* at 258 (quoting *Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh*, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). It is a "slim category" that gives rise to considerable confusion. *Id.* To clear some of the underbrush, the Supreme Court imposed a four-part inquiry:

> federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:
>
> (1) necessarily raised,
> (2) actually disputed,
> (3) substantial, and
> (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.

Id. (citing *Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg.*, 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005)).

Plainly, the Pappagallo claims do not necessarily raise a disputed and substantial federal question because the Plaintiffs have explicitly and entirely disclaimed any compensation that conceivably could be due from work, speculative if it occurred at all,[5] on naval or Coast Guard vessels. To the extent that Defendants assert that an "indivisible injury" provides a basis for asserting the existence of the necessary nexus to a federal question, assuming for the moment that the guesswork about work on federal vessels actually occurred, this Court has already rejected the argument and should continue to do so.

In *City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.*, the defendant oil companies supported federal-officer removal by claiming "these suits cannot separate harm caused by military fuel use from harm caused by civilian fuel use." 45 F.4th 699, 713 (3d Cir. 2022). Yet, because the City's complaint did "not su[e] over emissions caused by fuel provided to the federal government," this Court found the indivisible injury argument unavailing. *Id.* The Hoboken decision also accepted an *amicus*'s estimate that "the Department of Defense is responsible for less than 1/800th of

[5] There is no assertion other than a speculative statement from a coworker in discovery, that the decedent may have worked on federal vessels. *See* Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellees, ECF 11, at 1, 16.

the world's energy consumption." *Id.* This Court found it could not "hang our jurisdiction on so small a slice of the pie." *Id.* Here, the slice of pie is a product of pure conjecture and, at best, a minimal exposure to federal vessels. It therefore provides even a lesser basis for assuming jurisdiction and should not be countenanced.

Complete preemption provides a second basis for assuming federal jurisdiction. Complete preemption exists "when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action." *Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson*, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). In those circumstances, "even if pleaded in terms of state law, [the complaint] is in reality based on federal law." *Id.* As this Court noted, the Supreme Court has only identified three federal statutes where the federal claims vindicate the same interests as the state claims and constitute a basis for the extremely rare application of complete preemption. *City of Hoboken*, 45 F.4th at 707 (identifying the three as ERISA, the National Bank Act, and the Labor-Management Relations Act) (citing *Beneficial Nat'l Bank*, 539 U.S. at 6–8, 10–11). No qualifying statute is at issue in this matter.

2. Limiting claims to avoid federal jurisdiction is a legitimate option for plaintiffs and does not constitute artful pleading.

It is axiomatic that "federal courts permit individual plaintiffs, who are the masters of their complaints, to avoid removal to federal court, and to obtain a remand to state court, by stipulating to amounts at issue that fall below the federal jurisdictional requirement." *Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles*, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013). A plaintiff "gets to determine which substantive claims to bring against which defendants. And in so doing, she can establish—or not—the basis for a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction." *Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger*, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025). Those choices allow her to "destroy" diversity jurisdiction, plead only federal claims, or limit herself to state-law claims and "ensure a state forum." *Id.* That authority also permits a plaintiff to eschew claims related to a federal interest, as here, also to ensure a state forum.

Doing so does not constitute artful pleading. In its modern incarnation, the artful pleading doctrine unmasks federal claims disguised as state ones. *City of Hoboken*, 45 F.4th at 713. No such subterfuge is taking place in this matter, as "there are no federal claims to disguise." *Id.* To the extent any could exist, they have been entirely disclaimed, as is a plaintiff's prerogative.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, *amicus curiae* respectfully urges this Court to affirm the district court's remand order.

March 9, 2026

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CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP, WORD COUNT, IDENTICAL COMPLIANCE OF BRIEFS, & VIRUS CHECK

1. I certify that I am a member of the Bar of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. L.A.R. 28.3(d).

2. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7)(B) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Rule 32(f) and the Rules of this Court, it contains 4,160 words.

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 14-point Century Schoolbook in Microsoft Word for Microsoft 365.

3. I certify that the text of the electronic brief is identical to the text in the paper copies.

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Dated: March 9, 2026

/s/ Robert S. Peck
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on March 9, 2026, I caused an electronic copy of the foregoing to be electronically filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

Dated: March 9, 2026

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